Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2001

The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement of Torts
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement of Torts , in 54 Vanderbilt Law Review
1413 (2001).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/540

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

THE THEORY OF TORT DOCTRINE AND
THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

Keith N. Hylton

Abstract
The lack of detailed implications and general failure to come to grips with
important features of tort doctrine have been substantial shortcomings in the
dominant positive theory framework of Holmes and Posner. I extend the dominant
framework below to enable it to justify various intentional tort doctrines, and the
specific form and allocation of strict liability rules within tort law. After developing
the positive framework, I apply it to the Restatement (Third) of Tort Law. The
theory explains many of the detailed provisions and commentary of the Restatement,
and identifies one area in which the Restatement (Third) seems inconsistent with tort
doctrine. I also discuss the value of positive theory as a part of the Restatement
project.

Boston University School of Law, Boston 02215, knhylton@bu.edu. This paper was
prepared for the Conference on the Third Restatement of Torts at Vanderbilt
University Law School, September 15 – 16, 2000. I thank conference participants
for helpful comments, and Brian Kaiser for research assistance. This paper is
forthcoming in volume 54 of the Vanderbilt Law Review, April 2001.

I. Introduction
Though at times a source of controversy, the American Law Institute
performs an enormous public service through its Restatement projects. One of the
initial hurdles any such project confronts is whether it should aim to clarify and
illuminate the law, or to push the law in a certain direction. I think the Restatement
project is most productive when it aims to clarify and illuminate rather than guide or
control the development of legal doctrine. Efforts to guide and control risk
producing questionable interpretations of the law, undermining the value of the
Restatement in the long run. Fortunately, the Restatement of the Law of Torts comes
across largely as an effort to clarify and illuminate.1
I will argue below that this clarification function can be improved by
adopting, developing, and integrating a positive theoretical framework. A positive
theory of tort doctrine can reveal connections between rules that seem initially to be
unrelated, suggests functions for rules that seem difficult to justify on doctrinal
grounds, help the researcher predict the eventual tort rules adopted by courts in novel
areas of the law, and give us greater confidence in our interpretations of the case law.
I hope to demonstrate that a detailed positive framework can improve the
Restatement and similar efforts to clarify tort doctrine, and should be a central part of
the Restatement project.
In order to be useful to the Restatement project a positive theory of tort law
has to have detailed implications for tort doctrine. The lack of detailed implications
and general failure to come to grips with important features of tort doctrine have
been substantial shortcomings in the dominant positive framework, that of Holmes
and Posner. I extend the dominant framework below to enable it to justify various
intentional tort doctrines, and the specific form and allocation of strict liability rules
within tort law. After developing the positive framework, I apply it to the
Restatement (Third).2 The framework explains many of the detailed provisions and
commentary of the Restatement, and identifies one area in which the Restatement
(Third) seems inconsistent with tort doctrine. In the penultimate section I return to
the value of positive theory as a part of the Restatement project.

II. The Need for a Positive Theory of Tort Doctrine

It may seem a little odd to argue for the development of a positive theory of
tort doctrine after so much work in this vein has been published. But the two most
successful efforts to explain tort law, that of Holmes more than 100 years ago,3 and
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, chs. 1-2 (Discussion Draft, 1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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3
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more recently Posner,4 are incomplete in important respects. Overall I regard the
Holmes-Posner framework as a success, and like many scholars continue to work
largely within it. However, there are shortcomings in the framework that limit its
usefulness as a template for the detailed analysis of tort doctrine required by a
project such as the Restatement.
Holmes provided the first positive economic theory of tort law, anticipating
the core as well as many important components of Posner’s account. Posner, in his
seminal paper “A Theory of Negligence,”5 asserted that “Holmes left unclear what
he conceived the dominant purpose of the fault system to be, if it was not to
compensate.”6 This is nonsense. While Holmes did not have the advantage of a
century’s worth of economic theory and associated technical terminology to draw on,
his consistent reliance on cost-benefit arguments clearly indicates that he thought tort
doctrine aimed to minimize the costs of accidents and accident avoidance. Holmes
claimed that legal doctrine generally accords with “convenience,”7 which is about as
close as one could come in the late 1800s to saying “cost-minimization” or
“economic efficiency,” especially when addressing an audience comprised entirely
of lawyers.
The core of Holmes’s framework, as well as Posner’s, is the Hand formula
for negligence. Under the Hand formula, an actor is negligent, and therefore liable,
if on the margin the cost of avoiding the accident is less than the cost of the accident.
Again, the fact that Holmes did not use precisely this terminology is irrelevant,
because his arguments are so clearly consistent with this approach. It is the habit of
academics during a period of “normal science,” when the stakes are high precisely
because there is so little original on the table, to make much of minor distinctions in
terminology in order to allocate credit. Put this habit aside for the moment and
imagine Holmes writing for a population of lawyers trained as they are today, with a
highly developed economics literature to consult.
Because Holmes believed that the Hand formula explained so much of tort
doctrine, he found little need for a concept such as duty.8 Indeed, Holmes makes no
effort in The Common Law to explain the various duty doctrines, even though they
probably were more important in his day than in ours. Similarly, Holmes makes
little effort, beyond references to “policy coupled with tradition,”9 to explain the
function of strict liability. His brief references to strict liability suggest that he
believed the cost-internalization rationale commonly advanced today was the
4

I am referring to Richard Posner’s many articles on the positive economic theory of tort law, many
of them co-authored with William Landes. The first article, and the one I will discuss in this paper, is
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972).
5
Richard A. Posner, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972).
6
Id., at 31.
7
Holmes, supra note 3, at 1-2 (“The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds,
so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient...”).
8
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), ch. 2, at 90 (citing Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L.
Rev. 652, 660 (1873) (endorsing a general duty of “all the world to all the world.”)
9
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purpose of strict liability, but Holmes made no effort to get into the details of strict
liability doctrines, such as nuisance law.
Posner, like Holmes, treats the Hand formula as the core of tort doctrine, and
similarly seems to have little use for the notion of duty. However, the most
significant shortcoming in Posner’s framework appears in his treatment of strict
liability. Examine his words from “A Theory of Negligence”:
It is true that if you move from a regime where (say) railroads are
strictly liable for injuries inflicted in crossing accidents to one where
they are liable only if negligent, the costs to the railroads of crossing
accidents will be lower, and the output of railroad services probably
greater as a consequence. But it does not follow that any subsidy is
involved – unless it is proper usage to say that an industry is being
subsidized whenever a tax levied upon it is reduced or removed. As
we shall see, a negligence standard of liability, properly administered,
is broadly consistent with an optimum investment in accident
prevention by the enterprises subject to the standard.10
Posner is suggesting in this quote, as he has said at other times,11 that in the general
context in which the negligence rule applies, imposing strict liability is equivalent to
taxing the tortfeasor. The reason is that the negligence standard is sufficient to
induce the actor to take cost-justified precautions. If the actor is strictly liable, rather
than liable only if negligent, he will not go beyond the reasonable level of precaution
that he would choose under the negligence rule, which is the level that minimizes the
sum of accident and accident-avoidance costs. Put another way, the actor will not
spend $2 to avoid an expected liability of $1.
But a solid line of economic theory starting from Pigou12 and receiving its
most sophisticated applied treatment to the law by Calabresi13 indicates that Posner’s
tax-subsidy argument is probably wrong. A railroad that exercises the reasonable
level of precaution still lets off sparks that damage the crops of farmers. These
sparks are “external costs” or “externalities” associated with the activity of running
railroad cars. Under the theory of externalities, optimum investment in the activity
of running railroads is achieved only if these external costs are internalized to the
railroad owners. Thus, as a general matter, strict liability is not an imposition that
serves no other purpose than to tax the railroad, even in settings in which the courts
adhere to the negligence rule. While the negligence rule ensures optimum
investment in accident reduction, strict liability ensures both optimum investment in
accident reduction and activity levels.

10

Posner, supra note 5, at 30.
E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 179 (4th ed. 1992).
12
A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
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GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
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We have a serious problem here. Under the positive framework that Posner
has extended and developed, the general shape of tort doctrine, with negligence
serving as the default rule and strict liability as the exception, appears wrongheaded.
Economic theory seems as a general matter to suggest we should see strict liability as
the general rule with negligence appearing as the exception in certain instances.
Indeed, this basic insight motivated Calabresi’s impressive critique of the fault
system. Calabresi, working with the same advantages in scientific capital as Posner,
saw that the default rule suggested by the economic literature was strict liability
rather than negligence. Why the default rule should be negligence remains
unexplained under Posner’s framework. This is especially troubling for Posner’s
analysis because he, like Holmes, treats the Hand formula as the theoretical core of
tort doctrine.
The Posnerian extension of Holmes’ framework runs into difficulties when
confronting the doctrinal details of strict liability. In Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co.,14 Posner focused on one of six factors in the Restatement
(Second) § 520 test governing ultrahazardous activities: the inability to eliminate the
risk of accident by the exercise of due care (factor (c)). Elaborating, Posner said that
[s]ometimes, .., a particular type of accident cannot be prevented by
taking care but can be avoided, or its consequences minimized, by
shifting the activity in which the accident occurs to another locale,
where the risk or harm of an accident will be less, or by reducing the
scale of the activity…15
Now, the problem with focusing on this element of Restatement (Second) § 520 is
that this is always true of every accident setting. We can never eliminate the risk of
an accident, and we can always avoid and minimize consequences by shifting and
reducing the activity. Posner’s tendency to focus on the Hand formula leads him to
find only one reason to divert from the negligence standard, and that is the case in
which due care is insufficient to eliminate accidents. But that is a troubling standard
for strict liability because it is true in all cases. So we are left still searching for a
reason to apply strict liability in one case rather than another.
I do not mean to argue that factor (c) of Restatement (Second) § 520 is
useless. However, I do think that § 520 has to be regarded as a whole piece, rather
than reduced to a single component. Moreover, of the components in § 520, I find
factor (c) far from decisive in determining the appropriateness of strict liability, and
not very helpful standing alone. I will return to this below.
A positive framework for tort doctrine should be able to explain tort doctrine
at a rather detailed level. The best positive framework available, that of Holmes as
extended by Posner, has several shortcomings. It has not been applied extensively or
with much success in explaining various duty doctrines in tort law. Nor has it been
14
15

916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1177.
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applied to such “specific intent” torts as assault and malicious prosecution. And it
seems to do a poor job of explaining the allocation of strict liability rules, and
especially doctrine in the closely related areas of nuisance and ultrahazardous
activities. I will set out an alternative that succeeds on these issues below.

III. Extending the Positive Framework for Tort Doctrine

A richer positive theoretical framework begins with three observations, most
of them anticipated in part either in Holmes’ or in Posner’s analysis. First, as
Holmes stressed in several instances,16 tort law rules reflect statistical generalities, as
one should expect of default rules in general. Tort doctrine assumes individuals are
aware of basic physical laws, so that a driver who fails to brake in time is assumed to
have foreseen the likelihood of an accident. Owners of tigers and bears are assumed
to have foreseen the dangers they impose on others. A homeowner has the right to
assume that an individual who breaks into his house at night is there for a bad
purpose, and so on. Liability rules governing conduct, such as negligence or strict
liability, are typically based on statistical generalities concerning cause and effect.
Second, externalities are prevalent; they represent the norm rather than the
exception. I am referring both to negative externalities, costs imposed on others
outside of an exchange setting, and to positive externalities, or benefits conferred on
others in the absence of an exchange mediated through prices. Holmes signaled the
importance of benefit externalization for understanding tort doctrine when he noted
that
[a] man need not, it is true, do this or that act, -- the term act implies a
choice, -- but he must act somehow. Furthermore, the public
generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided,
and tends to the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing
the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor.17

Third, liability rules affect activity level and care level decisions – a version
of the standard distinction in economics between substitution effects and scale
effects. As Posner has made clear in his discussions of the choice between strict
liability and negligence, strict liability gives actors incentives to shift the location or
reduce the scale of their activities. The negligence rule does not have this effect
because the actor is relieved of liability after taking reasonable precaution under the
negligence rule. Because of the different effect of strict liability, we should expect
strict liability to be applied in tort law when a reduction in the actor’s activity level is
desirable. Contrary to Posner’s assumption in Indiana Harbor, the Hand formula
does not tell us when this is the case.
16
17

E.g. Holmes, supra note 3, at 155.
Holmes, supra note 3, at 95.
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One additional observation is that doctrinal rules achieve at best a roughly
optimal state. The tools provided by legal doctrine are blunt. We should not expect
them to bring about a “first-best” outcome in which every actor has hit the optimal
investment level on every margin. For this reason the mathematical models currently
employed in much of the law and economics literature are often of only marginal
relevance to tort doctrine, at least once we hit a sufficient level of detail. The
question of interest is whether the rule components (strict liability, negligence,
intent, and so on) provided in the doctrine have been put together in a way that
minimizes the sum of accident and accident-avoidance costs relative to some
alternative configuration of the rule components. In general (and as I will argue
below), this appears to be true. And as a general rule, mathematical models may be
helpful but are by no means necessary in evaluating this question.
A. The Economics and Law of Activity Levels
With the foregoing as background, I will set out a modified positive
framework for tort doctrine, building on one I have referred to before as the “missing
markets” model.18 For simplicity, let us consider the choice between negligence and
strict liability. If, assuming reasonable care, the externalized benefits are roughly
equal to the externalized costs connected with an activity, the negligence rule should
apply. The reason is there is no economic case for reducing the level of the activity
in this setting. Since the external benefits are roughly equal to the external costs,
there is no net external (i.e., third party) harm on average associated with the actor’s
activity when conducted reasonably. This is the context that includes most services
provided in the market. For example, a bus running down the street on which your
business is located externalizes risk to you, to the extent the bus may veer off the
road and damage your store. On the other hand, the bus service also externalizes a
benefit by bringing potential customers in contact with your business. Alternatively,
consider the risk externalization among cars on a street. Each car, driven reasonably,
externalizes roughly the same risk to other cars. Under a negligence rule, there is no
net external harm imposed on a given actor when every actor drives reasonably.
We can elaborate this argument by distinguishing private and social benefits.
Actors will pursue an activity up to the point where the incremental private gain or
benefit from the activity is just equal to the incremental private cost. For example, a
railroad will run its trains until the marginal revenue from service is equal to the
marginal cost, for if the marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost it will gain by
increasing service. Society, on the other hand, has an interest in seeing an activity
expanded up to the point where the marginal benefit to society (marginal social
benefit) is just equal to the marginal cost to society (marginal social cost). Suppose
the marginal revenue and marginal cost to the railroad are both equal to $10 per
passenger-mile (or freight-mile) at the firm’s privately optimal level of service.
Suppose that the external harm to farmers is $10 (per passenger-mile), and the
external benefit to farmers is $10. Since the marginal social benefit is $20 and the
18
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marginal social cost is $20, there is no economic argument for reducing the scale of
the railroad’s activity.
If, when railroads are operated with reasonable care, the externalized costs
are substantially greater than externalized benefits, then a strict liability rule is
appropriate against the actor responsible for the costs. Suppose the external cost to
farmers from the railroad is $110 per passenger-mile and the external benefit to them
is $10 per passenger-mile. At the railroad’s preferred level of service, the marginal
social cost of rail service is $120 (the sum of $110 external and $10 private), while
the marginal social benefit is only $20. Every additional mile of service reduces
society’s wealth by at least $100. In this case, reducing the scale of rail service
enhances society’s wealth. By internalizing the $110 to the railroad, a strict liability
rule would induce the railroad to choose a lower level of service where marginal
revenue is commensurately high. The new privately optimal level of service for the
railroad may be one where the railroad’s marginal cost is $112 and the railroad’s
marginal revenue is also $112.19 See Figure 1.

19

Alternatively, if railroad cost curves are downward-sloping, the new privately optimal service level
may be more costly at the margin. For example, the new privately optimal service level may be one
where the marginal social cost is $130 and the marginal revenue is also $130. For the purpose of this
discussion it does not matter whether the railroad’s cost curves are upward or downward sloping. The
important point is that when external costs are “internalized,” which is what we observe under strict
liability, the railroad’s service level declines.
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The railroad’s preferred activity level under strict liability, point B in figure 1,
is not the same as society’s best service level, which is point C. However, the
railroad’s preferred service level under strict liability is better, from society’s
perspective, than its preferred service level under negligence (point A). This serves
to illustrate the point that liability rules do not necessarily achieve the optimal
outcome, as defined within economic models. The optimal outcome would equate
the marginal social cost of service with its marginal social benefit. But this is
beyond the power of liability rules in many instances. The relevant question is
whether strict liability comes closer to bringing about socially optimal activity levels
than does negligence.
From the foregoing it should be clear that strict liability is socially preferable
to negligence whenever the external costs are substantially larger than external
benefits. When the ratio of external costs to external benefits is roughly one, the
negligence rule is preferable to strict liability. When the ratio is substantially greater
than one, strict liability is preferable to negligence. When the ratio is substantially
less than one, courts should choose liability rules that serve in effect to subsidize the
underlying activity, by reducing the actor’s expected liability below what he would
bear under the negligence rule. I will argue below that tort doctrine is consistent
with these general principles, and that they help us understand many of the details of
the intentional tort and of strict liability doctrines.
B. Some Immediate Applications
To begin, we hardly ever observe any tort rules that really can be described as
strict liability, in the sense that the potential defendant acts at his peril. Perhaps the
closest version of such a rule is observed in product liability doctrine, in the case of
manufacturing defect. The Restatement (Second) § 402A holds the manufacturer
liable for manufacturing defects without regard to his level of care or his activity
level.20 However, outside of this rather special case, I am aware of no others of such
pure strict liability. Instead, we observe rules that do not inquire into the fault of the
defendant, but do inquire into several other issues. For example, consider
Restatement (Second) § 520, governing ultrahazardous activities.21 Although Posner
focused on only one of those factors in Indiana Harbor, there are six factors
altogether in § 520. Similarly, nuisance doctrine examines a broad range of issues
outside of the defendant’s fault. What explains the structure of the strict liability
doctrines we observe in tort law?
The strict liability doctrines we observe in tort law aim to guide courts in
assessing whether the ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits is
substantially greater than one. This explains why we see rather complicated rules for
the most part under areas of law bearing the label “strict liability,” and why the
simple “pure strict liability” rule governing manufacturing defects is a unique and
special case. This also explains why Posner’s reduction, in Indiana Harbor, of
20
21

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402, cmt. A (1965).
See infra Part D.
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Restatement § 520 to a single factor – whether the danger can be eliminated with
reasonable care – is probably unwise and almost certainly inconsistent with tort
doctrine. The Hand formula approach advanced by Posner is insufficient to explain
the structure of strict liability rules.
We can think of tort law as consisting of rules with three liability-allocating
functions. First, there is the Hand formula, which, as Holmes and Posner have
stressed, is properly viewed as the general default rule for tort liability. Second,
there are channeling rules that allocated more or less liability than required by the
Hand rule. Strict liability doctrine can be put in this category, and so can rules
governing duty and proximate cause. These rules, as noted earlier, are based on
statistical generalities. Third, there are inference rules that serve generally to
minimize the likelihood of an erroneous decision. In this category fall such
seemingly unrelated doctrines as res ipsa loquitur and rules governing application of
the reasonable person test (e.g., to the insane, to disabilities, etc.). This is a
somewhat arbitrary categorization, since I could have just as well said that every
legal rule aims to minimize the expected costs of legal errors. However, rather than
approach every legal doctrine as an inference rule, I have begun this discussion by
analyzing the welfare implications of alternative liability rules (strict liability and
negligence). To remain consistent with this approach, I will treat the inference
problem within a relatively narrow scope.
Armed with the framework presented above and these functional categories, I
think one can march through much of the Restatement (Second or Third), finding
along the way better explanations for some of the doctrines and connections between
seemingly unrelated rules. Indeed, one could use the framework to reorder the
doctrines according to functional rather than formal legal categories. More
important, the framework is capable of revealing areas in which the Restatement fails
to clarify tort doctrine. I will follow the general outline of the Restatement (Third)
draft while sparing the reader of all of the details.

IV. . Positive Theory and the Restatement (Third)
A. Intentional Torts
Restatement (Third) § 1 tells us that an “actor’s causation of harm is
intentional if the actor brings about that harm either purposefully or knowingly.”22
Since we cannot know with certainty whether another person has acted “purposefully
or knowingly,” the determination of intent is a matter of inference. Proof of
purposeful or knowing conduct must, as Holmes stressed,23 hinge on whether the
facts are such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct would
lead to harm, or that the probability of harm flowing from his conduct was very high.
Viewed in this way, the determination of intent is not very different from the
22
23

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), ch.1, supra note 2, at § 1.
Holmes, supra note 3, at 147-49.
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determination of negligence. Since defendants will not walk into court and admit
intent or negligence, both require proof of facts that would lead a reasonable person
to conclude that the defendant acted under the requisite mental state.
The Restatement (Third) provides in the Comment to § 1 that the “concept of
intent is rendered important by the presence of a general rule … that imposes
liability on defendants who intentionally cause physical harm.”24 In other words,
intentional harms often give rise to strict liability. The interesting question is why.
The notion that intent is just an advanced or more pernicious form of fault seems
inadequate. There are important instances in which an actor can harm another
intentionally without having to worry about strict liability. For example, if I open up
a convenience store next door to yours and sell the same goods for one dollar less, I
must know that I will put you out of business. But I will not be held strictly liable
for your loss, and probably not liable at all. Moreover, the intent cases reveal two
levels of intent: “general intent”, or intent to carry out the act, and “specific intent,”
or intent to harm. Only the former level of intent is required in most cases, which
suggests that intent is generally no more pernicious as a form of fault than
negligence.
The liability rules governing intentional conduct serve as examples of
channeling rules designed to reduce the scale of certain activities. For those
activities for which the ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits is greater
than one, intentional conduct generally gives rise to strict liability. Another
distinction to incorporate in this set of cases is that between high and low transaction
cost settings. Harmful expropriations in low transaction cost settings should be taxed
in order to discourage efforts to evade the market. Most examples of intentional torts
giving rise to strict liability fall under these categories.25
Consider examples 2 and 3, from the Restatement:26
2. Wendy throws a rock at Bill, someone she dislikes, at a distance of
100 feet, wanting to hit Bill. . . . Wendy’s aim is true, and Bill is
struck by the rock.
3. The Jones Company runs an aluminum smelter, which emits
particulate fluorides as part of the industrial process. From an early
date Jones knows that these particles, carried by the air, will land on
neighboring property, and in doing so will bring about a range of
harms.

24

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), ch.1, supra note 2, at 1.
That is, they involve cases in which the ratio of externalized costs to benefits is high and transaction
costs are low (e.g., most trespasses), or the ratio of externalized costs to benefits is high and
transaction costs are high (e.g., nuisances). See Hylton, supra note 18, at 993.
26
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 1, cmt. d, illus. 2-3.
25
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In both examples the externalized costs of the activity, viewed generally, exceed
externalized benefits by a substantial margin. In such cases strict liability acts as a
corrective pricing mechanism, inducing actors to take into account the expected costs
of their activity to others. Although the assumption of rational accounting may
appear strained in the case of Wendy, the strict liability rules will most likely lead
the Jones Company to scale back its activity to a level where the marginal benefit to
Jones is equal to the marginal social cost of the activity.
The typical case of trespass – Bill wanders on to Joe’s property and removes
the shutters from his house – falls within this analysis. If the victim has a substantial
damage claim, the cost of the defendant’s activity to him probably outweighs its
benefits. Moreover, trespass doctrine is designed to induce actors to use the market
in settings where transaction costs are low. The more extreme case of an actor who
trespasses with an intent to harm – Bill wanders on to Joe’s property to throw rocks
through his windows – is also easily in the same category. In the more extreme case
of trespass with intent to harm, it is clear that as a general matter net external costs of
the activity are substantial and the actor should be encouraged to bargain for his
desired result. Courts often award punitive damages in these cases because they
recognize that simply internalizing costs may not be enough; it is better to eliminate
the activity entirely, which is the goal of overlapping criminal prohibitions.27
The Comment to § 1 notes without attempting to explain several features of
intentional tort doctrine that seem inconsistent with the broader scheme of intentional
tort doctrine or tort doctrine in other areas. These features are easily explained by
the framework of this paper. For example, consider the various doctrines requiring
proof of more than an intent to bring about harm, the transferred intent rule, and the
subordination of traditional negligence defenses under intentional tort doctrine.
For several intentional torts, intent to bring about the harm is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for liability. Consider the torts of assault, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and loss of prospective economic advantage.
Although the details of the rules differ in each case, each tort requires the plaintiff to
prove a higher level of intent than merely intent to carry out the act leading to the
harm. For example, assault doctrine requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
intended to harm or create the impression of impending harm. This goes beyond the
trespass and battery rules, which require proof merely that the defendant intended to
carry out his conduct.
I think it is not hard to show that each one of the torts requiring proof of more
than general intent essentially requires proof of specific intent, or intent to harm.
This is obvious in the case of assault. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress requires proof that the defendant’s conduct was “outrageous.”28 No one has
a good legal definition of outrageousness, but the purpose of the requirement is to
27

Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and The Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L. J. 421
(1998).
28
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 20, § 46.
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distinguish ordinary insults from expression that would create significant distress in
the average person. Such expression, it is reasonable to infer, must have been uttered
with an intent to harm the listener. I could continue through the other torts in this
category – e.g., malicious prosecution, interference with prospective economic
advantage, and others – but in each case I am sure the argument would be the same,
that the doctrine essentially requires proof of specific intent to harm.
Why does the law governing assault, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and interference with prospective advantage require proof of specific intent
to harm? The reason is that as a general rule the ratio of externalized costs to
externalized benefits is less than one for these activities. Each involves a substantial
intermingling of possibly harmful with beneficial activity. Assault cases, and those
involving intentional infliction of emotional distress, often involve aspects of
expression. As an activity, expression typically provides substantial external
benefits. As John Stuart Mill argued, free expression enables the correction of false
beliefs.29 From a better known economic perspective, expression is a public good in
the sense that it can provide the same benefits to numerous consumers.30 Most
economics textbooks explain that public goods should be subsidized, which is what
the law does in effect by requiring plaintiffs to prove specific intent to harm.
Transferred intent doctrine makes obvious sense once we view strict liability
as controlling activity levels. It does not matter whether Wendy aimed to hit Bill or
Joe with a rock. The transferred intent doctrine guarantees that Wendy will pay for
the harm regardless of the identity of the intended victim. The aim is not to punish
Wendy for desiring to hit Bill with a rock, but to give Wendy an incentive to “price
out” her own potentially harmful conduct before acting.
The subordination of traditional defenses, such as assumption of risk and
contributory negligence, is also easy to understand when strict liability is viewed as a
rule designed to channel liability toward activities that externalize far more costs
than benefits, or far more costs than most activities. To allow a contributory
negligence or assumption of risk defense for battery would relieve batterers of part of
the cost of their activity, a partial subsidy. But there is no good argument for
subsidizing battery. Where the harms outweigh the benefits, we should regulate the
activity by making the actor pay the full costs. Even when the foreseeable harms are
relatively small, we still want the actor to face the risk of paying the full costs, so
that he understands that he should seek a consensual transaction from the victim.

B. Negligence
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Since the Restatement tells us that the balancing test or Hand formula is
clearly the dominant method of determining negligence,31 the main issue of interest
is how one goes about inferring negligence. The balancing test balances the burden
of precaution against the incremental expected harms in the absence of precaution.
As Learned Hand put it, the balancing test compares B with PL, where B is the
burden of precaution and PL is the (incremental) probability of harm (P) multiplied
by the harm (L).
There are, to be sure, several special tort doctrines that follow more or less
directly from the balancing test. The “emergency rule” of Restatement § 7
recognizes that in emergencies the actor may be especially prone to make mistakes in
attempting to comply with the reasonable care standard, since an actor in an
emergency may be too frightened or distracted to make roughly accurate guesses as
to the magnitudes of B and PL. The rules governing the negligence of children also
follow directly from the BPL test. Ordinarily, a child is held to the standard of a
reasonably careful child of the same age, experience, and intelligence. This implies
that adults must take extra care to avoid injuring a child, which follows from the
balancing test because even when children are acting reasonably (given their
capacities) the risk of injury (PL) is higher than in a setting with only adults. Since
adults can observe and predict the harms associated with this higher level of risk,
they must adjust their levels of care upward. Adults are relieved of this
responsibility when children are engaged in adult activities, for in such cases adults
generally cannot observe the higher level of risk. Most adults will assume that actors
engaged in adult activities, such as driving, are adults.
The balancing test is conducted from the perspective of the reasonable man.
This forces a statistical averaging or objective approach to inferring negligence.
There are several implications of this approach noted in the literature. Holmes, as
usual the first to come to this issue, noted that the negligence test makes no special
allowances for the awkward, the test “does not attempt to see men as God sees
them.”32 People who have trouble complying with the conduct of the reasonable
person, for unobservable reasons, are in effect subjected to strict liability. Holmes
saw this problem as exposing a fundamental weakness in claims that negligence
doctrine is consistent with moral theory. Mark Grady, more recently, has argued that
the negligence test operates in effect as a strict liability rule in cases involving “nondurable” precaution.33 The reason is that people simply cannot be careful all of the
time. Someone will slip up eventually, and competition will force you to take on
some risk of error. While Holmes envisioned negligence falling unfairly across a
population of different actors with randomly distributed abilities, Grady envisions
the negligence rule falling unfairly over time against a single actor as he passes
through random realizations of his own ability levels. The averaging under the
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balancing test also excludes certain desires or objectives,34 such as those of the
motorist who likes to race, which some regard as supporting the moral theory of
negligence doctrine. I might add to this the case in which the negligence rule fails to
consider the ephemeral benefits or desires of the average actor, perhaps as another
point on the side of the moral vision.
The reasonable person test should be viewed as an inference rule, having
nothing to do with the morality issue. The BPL test involves some components that
are either unobservable or imperfectly observable to jurors. The most important one
is the defendant’s burden of precaution, B. The jury cannot observe this quantity,
and the defendant has every incentive to assert that it is extremely high. The jury
does observe the general population distribution of B. Hence, in a rational inference
system, the jury should tend to put a great deal of weight on the average drawn from
the general distribution, unless the defendant can offer concrete proof that his burden
of precaution is far above the average. It follows immediately from this that rules
excluding unprovable claims of unusual awkwardness or unusual desires would be a
part of the balancing test. The reasonable person test incorporates such rules.
It is hard to distinguish how such a rational inference system would differ
from one in which there is an alleged “hindsight bias.”35 Hindsight bias apparently
occurs because people think things are more likely to happen once they happen.
While that is true, the difficult part is determining whether this should be labeled as a
bias. Bayesians will update their predictions of the probability an event will happen
after it happens. This much of hindsight judgment is entirely rational and should not
be treated as a type of cognitive bias. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to design a
test that would distinguish Bayesian updating from an alleged hindsight bias. To this
we should add the strategic problem referred to above; that juries must discount
claims by the defendant that the probability of harm is extremely low, because they
know that the defendant’s incentive is to lie. A rational jury will therefore put a
great deal of weight on the Bayesian adjusted estimate of P rather than the
defendant’s evidence of P.
The class of inference rules also includes doctrines governing unreasonable
conduct due to mental or emotional disability. Restatement § 9c says that “[u]nless
the actor is a child, the actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in
determining whether conduct is negligent.” The rationale follows from the foregoing
argument. It is very hard to tell whether someone is too emotionally unstable or
unintelligent to comply with the reasonable care standard. Even if such a defense
were permitted, juries would discount defendants’ attempts to use it after its abuse
became common knowledge. The defendant in Vaughan v. Menlove36 argued that
the reasonable care standard is unfair and unpredictable from the perspective of an
34
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actor who is mentally incapable of complying. However, the uncertainty problem
would be considerably worse if the disability defense were allowed. If juries did not
discount the defense entirely, the reasonable care standard would become too
uncertain to serve as a constraint on conduct.
C. Duty
The Restatement takes a rather vague and uncommitted stance on the duty
issue. Restatement § 6 says explicitly that “[f]indings of no duty are unusual, and are
based on judicial recognition of special problems of principle or policy that justify
the withholding of liability.”37 We are told in Comments c and d of areas of the case
law in which the duty issue seems to be an appropriate area of concern. However,
there is no discussion of underlying principles. The Reporter’s Note buries the duty
issue even further, noting that “[m]odern scholars tend to classify the issue of the
foreseeable plaintiff under the general heading of proximate causation.”38
The Restatement’s discussion of duty illustrates the need for further
development of the positive framework for tort doctrine and integration of that
framework into the Restatement project. The duty doctrines are examples of
channeling rules that allocate liability largely in response to activity level concerns.
For example, consider the general rule that a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser,
save that of intentionally or recklessly harming him. This rule is simply a
complement of the strict liability rule imposed on trespassers. The strict liability rule
deters or reduces the scale of trespassing as an activity. In order to accomplish this
function, the rule must be joined by a complementary rule relieving the landowner of
a duty to provide and care for the trespasser. This is the policy underlying the rule
that a landowner has no duty to a trespasser.
Consider the general rule that there is no duty to rescue. There are so many
exceptions to this rule that one can fairly doubt whether there is any substance to the
general rule at all. However, the rescue doctrine should be viewed as a rule that
channels tort liability away from actors whose activities are not causally or
probabilistically related to the victim’s harm. Generally, tort law imposes negligence
liability only on those actors who should have foreseen the victim’s harm as a likely
consequence of their activity. This is not the case in the rescue settings where no
duty is found. A person reading a book on a beach does not foresee another person
drowning as a result of his activity.
Now one could argue that a duty to rescue would force the man on the beach
to foresee the possible drowning accidents around him. But this would require him
to be aware and prepared to react to the drowning risk at all times. Since the cost of
complying with this expectation is so high, many potential rescuers would avoid the
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risk altogether and stay home. Thus, as Landes and Posner recognized, the essential
rationale for the rescue doctrine is based on its activity level effects.39
Many scholars and courts treat duty issues as part of the proximate cause
question today. This is a sensible approach, given that the function of proximate
cause is to channel liability away from actors engaged in activities that are not
causally or probabilistically related to the victim’s harm. However, this is an
approach that creates some losses in doctrinal clarity. If channeling issues are dealt
with as matters of duty, then they are matters of law, which courts will treat as
important precedents. If, on the other hand, they are treated as matters of proximate
cause, then they are primarily questions for the jury. As jury questions, they fail to
create important rules to guide future courts.
The question whether channeling issues should be dealt with under proximate
cause or duty doctrine returns us to one of the important functions of inference rules.
Inference rules provide predictability and stability to the law by preventing courts
from giving weight to unverifiable defenses. Duty rules, in addition to serving the
channeling function spelled out here, also serve the same function as inference rules,
when compared to the alternative of proximate cause analysis. Duty rules are to
some extent preferable to proximate cause rules, because they contribute to the
predictability of legal doctrine. And if actors are supposed to comply with the tort
rules, the courts should be aiming to state them with some degree of clarity. Thus, it
should not be regarded as a matter of indifference whether questions of duty are dealt
with as “duty rules” or as proximate cause rules. The more consistent and reliable
duty doctrines (e.g., no duty to a trespasser) should be analyzed by courts under the
heading of duty rather than proximate cause.

D. Strict Liability

Tort law includes several forms of liability labeled strict: liability for animals,
abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, producer liability, vicarious liability.
However, not all of these versions share similar doctrinal features. The first three
have similar doctrines, and fall under the framework of this paper. Products liability
includes two components referred to as strict liability: liability for manufacturing
defects, and liability for defective designs. Liability for manufacturing defects is
perhaps the only example in tort law of pure strict liability, in the sense that an injury
caused by a manufacturing defect leads directly to liability. Design defect doctrine,
though labeled strict liability, actually applies a type of negligence test to the design
39
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decision. Vicarious liability, as the Restatement Comment notes, requires proof of
negligence against the agent.40
I will focus here on liability for abnormally dangerous activities.
Restatement (Third) § 21 defines an abnormally dangerous activity as follows: (1)
the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even
when reasonable care is exercise by all actors; and (2) the activity is not a matter of
common usage. Restatement (Second) § 520 defines an abnormally dangerous
activity by the following six factors: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c)
inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which
the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to
the place where it is carried on and; (f) extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
As between the two Restatement definitions, I find the Restatement (Second)
§ 520 more informative, and more consistent with the framework of this paper. The
first three factors of Restatement (Second) § 520 have been simplified and squeezed
into the first factor of Restatement (Third) § 21 without loss of any significant parts.
The first three factors signal the importance of residual risk in strict liability doctrine,
i.e., the risk that remains once all actors are taking reasonable care. Strict liability
doctrine, under the framework presented here, is largely concerned with correcting
substantial imbalances in the exchange of residual harms. If the residual risk is not
“highly significant,” then strict liability is probably not appropriate. The last three
factors of Restatement (Second) § 520 are not really captured by the second factor of
Restatement (Third) § 21. Restatement § 21 refers only to the common usage issue,
while the last three factors of Restatement (Second) § 520 refer to common usage
and the extent to which there is some reciprocity in the exchange of residual risks
and benefits among adjacent activities.
Restatement (Second) § 520 lays out a test that seems to guide courts in
assessing the ratio of externalized costs and benefits, which is the general form of
strict liability test suggested by the missing-markets framework of this paper. The
first three requirements establish a threshold requirement that the residual risk (i.e.,
the risk externalized when actors are taking reasonable care) is substantial. The last
three follow on with an important part of the test. If all of the last three factors are
satisfied, we generally can be sure that there is a non-reciprocal exchange of risks
between the defendant’s activity and others or that the defendant’s activity
externalizes far more risk than benefit. Given this, it is appropriate to tax the activity
with strict liability, in order to give the actor an incentive to reduce its scale closer to
the optimal level (return to Figure 1) or to shift the activity to a different locale.
The positive framework of this paper suggests that the more detailed test set
out in § 520 is superior to that in § 21. Section 21’s reference to common usage does
not guide the court toward making an effort to examine the degree of reciprocity in
40
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the exchange of residual risks. Usually, if an activity is one of common usage there
will be a roughly reciprocal exchange of residual risks. However, this may not
always be the case. For example, the water reservoir in Rylands v. Fletcher41 may
have been a relatively common, or at least not uncommon, feature in England during
the 1800s.42 It would be easy to reach the conclusion that a reservoir externalizes far
more non-reciprocated risk than benefit onto adjacent activities.43 However, it might
have been difficult to say whether the reservoir was a matter of common usage. It is
troubling to find that the most recent Restatement effort to codify the Rylands
doctrine might have led to a different result if applied in the Rylands case.
This criticism applies with greater force to Posner’s reduction, in Indiana
Harbor, of § 520 to a single factor – whether the harm can be eliminated by
reasonable care. If one were to apply this factor alone to the Rylands case, one might
conclude that strict liability is inappropriate in that setting. After all, it would be a
bit much to ask a reservoir owner to move it to another location, and it is hard to see
how he could reduce the scale of his activity. Since the activity level responses
induced by strict liability are minimal in the short run, and the harm in Rylands
might have been reduced substantially through additional care, Posner’s test could
easily lead to a different result in the Rylands case.
In addition to suggesting that § 520 is superior to § 21 as a codification of
Rylands doctrine, the theory of this paper provides a better explanation of Rylands,
and its place in the broader scheme of tort doctrine, than any other theory of which I
am aware. The various opinions in the Rylands litigation make no reference to
whether the defendant’s reservoir was a matter of common usage. However, the
opinions do stress the inequitable exchange of residual risks in Rylands and similar
cases. Consider Justice Blackburn’s opinion in the first appeal:
The general rule … seems on principle just. The person whose grass
or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or
whose mine is flooded by water from his neighbour’s reservoir, or
whose cellar is invaded by filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose
habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his
neighbour’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own;
and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has
brought something on his own property which was not naturally there,
harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but
which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour’s,
should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does
not succeed in confining it to his own property.
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Virtually all of the examples discussed in the Rylands opinions – cattle, fumes, water
– were most likely matters of common usage at the time. The judges in Rylands
seemed to be concerned primarily with the inequitable allocation of residual risk.
Of the other theories available, Fletcher’s reciprocal risk theory seems to also
provide a good explanation of the Rylands doctrine.44 According to Fletcher, tort
liability is based largely on whether the exchange of risk between two actors can be
regarded as reciprocal or roughly equal. Where the exchange is roughly equal, the
negligence rule applies; where the exchange is unequal, strict liability applies to the
actor who externalizes the most risk. This theory has an appealing simplicity and
seems to explain the Rylands case. However, Fletcher’s theory lacks a solid
theoretical foundation, a problem that becomes obvious the moment you ask why
reciprocal risk-exchange should matter. Moreover, because it lacks a good
theoretical foundation, it is inadequate, without a good deal of extra work, to explain
many of the simplest negligence cases. For example, medical malpractice cases
involve a doctor, who throws a lot of risk onto a patient, who in turn throws virtually
no risk onto the doctor. The negligence rule applies, even though there is an obvious
imbalance in the exchange of residual risks.
Having mentioned animals in the course of discussing the Rylands doctrine, I
see little need here to explore in detail the implications of this paper’s framework for
the Restatement provisions on liability for animals. Strict liability applies because of
the inequitable exchange of residual risks. On the basis of this theory, it seems clear
that the provisions regarding liability for animals can be treated as a special case of
the Rylands doctrine. This is as it should be, since the Rylands opinions mention
animals to illustrate the general argument for strict liability.

V. Returning to the Restatement’s purpose

The payoff from an extended positive framework is that it explains tort
doctrine in detail, and suggests functional similarities among tort rules. The
framework presented here solves the most important puzzle generated under the
Holmes-Posner framework: the prevalence of the negligence rule. The framework
also explains the doctrine governing “specific intent” (intent-to-harm) torts such as
assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the importance of the
distinction between general and specific intent torts, and its implications for punitive
damages; the function, as well as the relative merits, of duty and proximate cause
rules; and the specific contours of strict liability doctrines. These are all areas of tort
doctrine that are either unexplained or insufficiently explained under the HolmesPosner framework. The framework of this paper also extends our understanding of
the reasonable-person standard and functionally related rules.
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A detailed positive theoretical framework is useful to the Restatement project
in explaining rules, ordering them by function, and avoiding mistakes in
interpretation. There is always a choice in any project such as the Restatement
whether to lay out the rules according to formal legal categories or to lay them out
according to some notion of their functions. Since the Restatement of Torts has
traditionally been laid out according to formal legal categories (intent, negligence,
etc.), revisions should continue with this format. However, a better sense of the
functional similarities among rules should enhance efforts to clarify by reducing the
fragmentation or diffusion of legal concepts. It also helps avoid revising in the
wrong direction.
I think the framework here itself makes a case for incorporating positive
theory as a central part of the Restatement project. The law changes over time, in
response to changes in technology and preferences. It is important, in view of its
fluidity, to get a glimpse of the underlying skeletal structure of legal doctrine, which
is what positive theory aims to do. Of course, Langdell thought he was getting at the
skeleton of the law too, but there is a big difference between positive theory, as
understood today, and the Langdellian project. While the Langdellian approach aims
to discover a core set of fundamental legal rules, which is a doubtful exercise, the
positive theory approach aims to discover the functions of legal rules, and to work
backwards toward a deeper understanding of rules from an understanding of their
functions. The relative merits of these two approaches have been revealed over the
past century. While the Langdellian approach has yielded no useful insights into tort
doctrine, the positive theory approach, begun with Holmes’ decision to break from
the Langdellian mold, has given us an enormously useful framework for
understanding tort doctrine.
Moreover, positive theory constrains “restaters” (everyone involved in the
Restatement project) of the law in a manner that enhances the value of the
Restatement. It is much harder to push the law in a novel, unwarranted direction
when one is also constrained to remain consistent with a broader theoretical
framework. This enhances the long-term value of the Restatement by dampening
opportunities to use it as a launching pad for legal reform efforts. This, in turn,
benefits “restaters” by reducing incentives for legal pressure groups to insert
themselves into the Restatement project.45
VI. . Conclusion
The positive tort theory framework of Holmes and Posner is largely
successful, though lacking sufficient detail to explain many tort doctrines. I have
extended the framework here and applied it to the Restatement (Third) of Tort Law.
The extended framework explains tort doctrine at a highly detailed level, which is
important if positive theory is to be useful to the Restatement project.
45
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